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Institutional reforms currently underway in Pakistan’s irrigation and drainage sector 
require that farmers take over the operation and maintenance responsibilities of their 
secondary canals. However, the farmers need to be organised first, for which investments 
are a prerequisite. A great deal of skepticism about the farmers’ collective ability and 
willingness to undertake the needed tasks exists, even now when they are actually 
organised. This skepticism originates from past experiences when direct subsidies were 
offered to induce collective action. Theoretically, collective action can be more 
sustainable if investments are made in capacity building for the tasks that the farmers 
have to perform to improve the service delivery. Farmers are being organised for 
distributary operation and maintenance. So far, the delay in formulation of an appropriate 
legal framework has prevented the irrigation departments from formally transferring the 
operation and maintenance responsibilities to farmers. Self-help-based maintenance has 
been the only avenue for farmers to participate in the management of the irrigation 
system. 
The paper uses data pertaining to the cost of facilitation and estimates the amount of 
resources mobilised for two successive years from a pilot project. The analysis shows that 
investments made for facilitation do pay off. Investment in facilitation returns 69 percent 
higher than the actual investment per year during the initial years. In the short-run, the 
returns to facilitation indicate an increasing trend. The paper argues that when compared 
to previous approaches adopted in Pakistan, investments for facilitation and capacity 
building have a greater chance of prompting sustainable collective action for irrigation 
and drainage management. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Reforms currently underway in Pakistan are intended to restructure the 
institutional framework for irrigation and drainage services of the large canal system. 
These reforms aim at withdrawing subsidies by creating autonomous entities at 
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various levels of the irrigation and drainage system. The four Provincial Irrigation 
Departments (PIDs) are being transformed into the Provincial Irrigation and 
Drainage Authorities (PIDAs). The PIDAs have the mandate to establish financially 
autonomous Area Water Boards (AWBs) at canal commands, responsible for 
operation and maintenance (O&M), as well as for the management of irrigation and 
drainage facilities located within their areas of jurisdiction. The AWBs will 
encourage the formation of financially autonomous and self-reliant Farmer 
Organisations (FOs) on secondary channels to undertake O&M of their respective 
distributaries and drainage facilities. Farmers will also pay O&M costs for the 
upstream system. The PIDAs, AWBs and FOs are expected to operate as 
management organisations with sound business principles. Initially, the PIDAs are 
establishing some pilot AWBs and FOs in all of the four provinces to acquire 
necessary experience for large-scale replications. 
Past approaches to prompt collective action for irrigation system maintenance 
in Pakistan have been to offer direct subsidies rather than investing in social 
mobilisation and capacity building of the target group. Such approaches, for 
example, material incentives for lining the watercourses, however, have met with 
partial success. Many Water Users Associations could not sustain themselves in the 
long run and became defunct after successful rehabilitation of the watercourses. This 
partially can be attributed to lack of investment in human resource development. 
Such approaches have focussed more on the hardware side than on the software side 
of collective action. Inducing collective action through incentives of improved 
capacity for service delivery may prove much more effective. 
Several pilot projects underway in three of the four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, 
and North-West Frontier Province) have organised farmers at the distributary canals. 
The major focus of the current initiatives of organising farmers is to develop capacity 
through training and information sharing, rather than providing subsidies on 
hardware. The expectations from resultant farmer organisations are that these will 
learn and implement strategies in operation and maintenance of their irrigation and 
drainage channels that will improve their service delivery. Various government and 
non-government agencies have facilitated such experiments, which have reached 
different degrees of maturity. FOs formed through these projects are looking forward 
to managing their own distributaries, as many of them are currently negotiating the 
taking over of management responsibilities with the government. The PIDAs express 
their eagerness to implement the legal framework for the transfer process as soon as 
it is approved. Once the legal framework comes into effect, the transfer process may 
gain momentum and PIDAs may focus efforts on forming more FOs. 
Farmers need facilitation in terms of information, knowledge, training, and 
capacity to manage themselves, at least initially, as most of them lack experience 
with formal organisation. After organising and training farmers the facilitation inputs 
would eventually be withdrawn because each FO will need to become self-sufficient 
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within a stipulated period. If FOs can maintain high O&M standards as facilitation 
inputs decline gradually, they may be expected to become sustainable, self-sufficient 
and self-reliant entities. Likewise, if the FOs learn to undertake more cost-effective 
O&M during the subsequent years, these may be able to offer a better service to their 
members for the money. FOs offering cheaper O&M may have a better chance of 
social acceptability and financial sustainability. 
The past efforts for strengthening collective action among farmers in 
Pakistan’s irrigation sector could not sustain. Such projects used subsidies as 
incentives for collective action. Provision of information and training instead of any 
monetary or physical incentive for strengthening collective action may produce 
different results. 
This paper analyses the case of a pilot FO to address the question of whether 
facilitation inputs provided to the FOs produce returns in terms of resource 
mobilisation for the distributary maintenance. The data collected by the field team 
which organised the FO is analysed to assess the effect of varying levels of 
facilitation on resource mobilisation and the maintenance work undertaken by the 
FO. 
Section 2 of the paper describes the research locale and the background, as 
well as the plan and execution of the maintenance activities carried out by the FO. 
Section 3 discusses the conceptual framework for farmer’s organisations in irrigation 
management and methodology for data analysis. Section 4 presents the results and 
Section 5, the conclusion. 
 
2.  RESEARCH LOCALE AND BACKGROUND 
The case of the Farmer’s Organisation of the Hakra 4-R Distributary, an off-
take from the Hakra Branch Canal in the Eastern Sadiqia Canal Command in the 
southern part of the Punjab Province, serves as the reference. The Hakra 4-R 
Distributary is a medium- to large-scale secondary canal with an authorised 
discharge of 5.46 cubic meters per second and a culturable command area of around 
18,000 ha. The distributary feeds 124 irrigation outlets through its main channel and 
two minors. The distributary system’s 36-kilometer-long main channel has five drop-
structures along its entire length, and serves around 4,700 farms. The farmers 
comprise a mix of local people, settlers from the time when the irrigation system was 
constructed during the 1920s and migrants coming from India after the partition of 
the sub-continent in 1947. 
The distributary was in a state of disrepair. Its banks were rapidly 
deteriorating due to animal and vehicular traffic. The freeboard had almost 
disappeared. The major maintenance problems of the distributary included berm-
cutting, widened cross-sections, scouring in the head reach, silt deposition in the tail 
reach and weak banks, which disturb the water supplies. Unreliable and erratic 
supplies were causing productivity loss to the farmers. The branch canal’s rotational 
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schedule, that feeds the distributary, was unorganised [Waheed-uz-Zaman (1998)]. 
The farmers complained about inequity in water distribution, and wanted 
improvements to the water supply [Cheema et al. (1997)]. This poor situation with 
regard to equitable distribution and unreliability of supplies encouraged the farmers 
to engage in a dialogue among themselves, which was initiated by the field staff of 
the International Water Management Institute (IWMI). After undergoing a slow, 
stepwise and carefully planned out process of social organisation for distributary 
management, the farmers established a farmer organisation to negotiate the takeover 
of O&M tasks of the distributary with the PID [Bandaragoda et al. (1997)]. The main 
organisational strategies revolved around the philosophy of building capacity 
through investments in training and facilitation. No hardware incentives had been 
provided to the farmers for inducing collective action. 
The FO is a three-tiered organisation representing farmers at the watercourse, 
subsystem and the distributary level. The social organisation process relied heavily 
on information provision, local capacity building through training, bringing farmers 
together through evolving consensus. No physical or monetary incentive has been 
given to the farmers for engaging them in the collective action. 
IWMI collaborated with the FO to assess the overall maintenance 
requirements of the distributary with active participation by farmers and their leaders 
[Waheed-uz-Zaman (1998)]. The farmer-leaders have been trained in carrying out 
simple water measurements, as well as in carrying out financial and organisational 
tasks. Currently, the FO and the government are at the negotiating table to finalise 
the transfer of O&M responsibilities at the distributary canal. The farmers intend to 
improve the physical condition of the distributary through undertaking maintenance 
and repairs. They want to distribute water equitably among the members. The FO is 
willing to pay a proportionate share of the main system’s O&M expenditures. 
Apart from verbal commitments indicating farmers’ willingness to pay for 
O&M, the FO has demonstrated its capacity for collective action by undertaking self-
help maintenance activities during the 1997–98 and 1998–99 canal closure periods. 
These activities have been documented by the project staff [Waheed-uz-Zaman 
(1998a)]. The levels of support from IWMI as well as the resources mobilised varied 
for these two years. 
The FO general body met in December 1997, and members decided to 
demonstrate their collective willingness and ability to participate in the performance 
of O&M responsibilities. The FO interacted with the local staff of the Punjab 
Irrigation Department (PID) to plan and coordinate the maintenance activities. The 
PID informed that the two minors and the tail reach of the distributary were being 
lined, and needed no maintenance. The middle reach of the main channel did not 
have much maintenance problems. Therefore, the FO decided to strengthen the banks 
of the distributary in the head reach as, in the past, most breeches occurred in this 
reach due to weak banks. The FO formed a maintenance committee comprising 5 
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farmers-members. The committee with assistance from the facilitators inspected the 
potential sites and identified areas requiring maintenance. The maintenance 
committee decided to undertake maintenance for five consecutive days. By dividing 
the head reach into five sub-reaches, one sub-reach was allocated to each of the 5 
subsystem level organisations. Each subsystem organisation performed maintenance 
tasks for one of the five days. The committee also evaluated the work performance of 
various maintenance groups. The team of social organisers facilitated the process of 
information dissemination, organisation and supervision. The irrigation staff was 
requested to participate in the activity for guiding the FO. However, the staff did not 
show up due to their tight duties elsewhere as well as due to their negative feelings 
about farmer’s participation. 
During the 1998–99 canal closure the FO was informed that the maintenance 
work was assigned to a contractor, who would strengthen the banks of the 
distributary after a few months, and that the FO’s maintenance initiatives would not 
be required. However, the FO decided to undertake maintenance for demonstrating 
their willingness as well as to safeguard against the immediate breeches after the 
closure. Again, a maintenance committee was appointed and assistance from the PID 
was sought, which deputed the sub-engineer to participate in the planning and 
execution of the activities. All the farmers from various subsystem organisations had 
to undertake maintenance activities on the same day. The maintenance committee 
identified ten most weak sites. The committee assigned these sights to various 
maintenance groups comprising 5–15 farmers and appointed one farmer-leader to 
supervise the work. The maintenance groups were organised proportionate to the 
number of tractors and manpower, and depending on the nature of the work to be 
performed. Each maintenance group was also accompanied by one of several PID 
maintenance staff members. 
Under the prevailing legal framework, the PID reserves all the rights for 
distributary O&M, and the distributary channel’s maintenance was not the FO’s 
responsibility. Therefore, the FO only wanted to demonstrate its collective 
willingness and ability to manage the distributary O&M. Since the FO’s maintenance 
initiatives were not directed towards carrying out the necessary repairs, resource 
mobilisation may not have necessarily resulted in quality work. 
 
3.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
During the colonial rule, British engineers constructed Pakistan’s huge canal 
irrigation system up to 1930s and the users were settled gradually as the system 
evolved. Since then, the farmers have always been seen as beneficiaries of the 
system without any right to influence management at the higher levels. Poor 
management of the irrigation system has resulted into unsatisfactory service to 
farmers. That is also one of the reasons for stagnant productivity of major crops, as 
well as waterlogging and salinity due to unreliable and inequitable supplies. Some 
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researchers [for instance, Meinzen-Dick et al. (1995)] believe that the farmers are 
less likely to pay fees to cover full O&M costs if they are excluded at the time of 
system planning and construction. This argument seems valid for Pakistan’s canal 
system, which is now facing severe financial crises, as the assessed water rates are 
not collected. In general, user participation in the O&M increases the likelihood for 
systems’ better maintenance [World Bank (1993), p. 55]. 
Owing to the growing burden of subsidised irrigation, governments generally 
tend to involve users at various stages of planning, construction and O&M of 
irrigation system with the intention of reducing government’s expenditure [Byrnes 
(1992), p. 52]. Investments in irrigation institutions, such as water users’ associa-
tions, may lead to a positive rate of return from participatory projects [Bagadion and 
Korten (1991)]. Like governments, participatory projects do have additional costs for 
farmers, such as increased contributions in cash and kind for O&M, transaction costs 
that include convening and attending meetings, taking over management functions, 
conflict management etc. However, if the farmers themselves are able to set the level 
of contributions and control their use, it is more likely that they would pay higher 
contributions than they pay under government control. 
Generally, the farmers will respond positively to an irrigation system that 
gives them a certain degree of control over water supplies. Once the farmers take 
over the responsibility for managing the system, their confidence in their 
management capacities will grow with the passage of time. The farmers should have 
enough degree of control and authority that allows them to perform their tasks at a 
reasonable cost [Meinzen-Dick et al. (1995)]. Farmers’ involvement gives them a 
‘sense of ownership’ and they tend to protect irrigation facilities [NIACONSULT 
(1993); Merry and Murray-Rust (1991)]. Farmers may be willing to bear additional 
costs if they see a return to their investments in terms of improved irrigation service 
[Meinzen-Dick et al. (1995)], as they get rapid responses to system breakdowns 
[Plusquellec (1994)]. However, organising them into irrigation associations may 
require a great deal of persuasion and facilitation. As agriculturists, farmers’ 
livelihoods also depend on a number of non-water inputs, and their organisations 
may assume other responsibilities as they become well organised and trained for 
irrigation management [Meinzen-Dick et al. (1995), p. 7]. 
The farmers should decide how they desire to carry out activities by 
themselves. The catalyst or the organisers should only facilitate the process and 
refrain from imposing their agenda [Korten (1993), p. 2; Cernea and Meinzen-Dick 
(1992)]. The farmer organisations should clearly specify rules that allocate 
responsibilities, conflict management, resource mobilisation and management 
[Ostrom (1992); Tang (1992)]. Facilitators should act as farmers’ communication 
channels until higher level organisations are formed and can assume the role, or until 
the farmers are sufficiently familiar with the system to accomplish this on their own. 
In effect, the organisers should act as low-tech interactive communication media, by 
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broadcasting a series of focused messages to individual farmers and groups 
[Meinzen-Dick et al. (1995)]. Technical training and supervision should be provided 
to the organisation and its leadership until the organisation devolves the capacity to 
carry out tasks of its own. 
Though an enabling law is already in place in the context of the institutional 
reforms in Pakistan, proceeding further with turning the responsibilities over to the 
FOs for distributary management is limited in several respects [Muhammad (1998)]. 
While these projects were planned, the assumption was that the government would 
be ready with all essential institutional mechanisms to transfer the responsibilities to 
the FOs as soon as these were organised [See, for instance, IIMI (1996)]. However, 
no handing over of responsibilities has taken place to date. The FOs, together with 
the project staff, are waiting for the responsibilities to be transferred from the 
government to the FOs, which necessitates continued facilitation until the FOs 
acquire responsibilities. 
The situation of organised farmers waiting for responsibilities has an inherent 
risk of FOs becoming more dependant on continued facilitation, because with the 
passage of time, the farmers may lose their initial momentum and interest. A 
situation like this would be counter-productive to the central idea of the institutional 
reforms and may lead to greater subsidy in terms of increased costs of these projects. 
Institutional reforms will only be relevant to improve the performance of the 
irrigation system if these FOs prove to be sustainable with the passage of time. Even 
if these organisations continue to require a certain degree of facilitation and 
catalysing efforts, the cost of the facilitation has to be less than the benefits arising 
from these organisations for the reforms to be meaningful in terms of cost savings to 
the government. 
Since formal responsibilities have not been assigned to the FOs as yet, the 
only possibility of assessing the outcome of facilitating FOs is to assess the self-help 
maintenance activities. The FO of the Hakra 4-R Distributary has been carrying out 
maintenance for two consecutive years. The explicit objective of the maintenance 
activities was to demonstrate collective willingness and ability to take over O&M of 
the distributary, yet some physical work was also accomplished. The objective of 
demonstrating willingness and ability behind organising maintenance may have 
adversely affected the potential amount of work that the FO could have 
accomplished with the same set of mobilised resources, as it would tend to use 
resources more efficiently. Yet, the FO’s undertaking of some of the maintenance 
activities have saved the government some funds for other investments. The 
government therefore, has definitely benefited from these maintenance activities. On 
the other hand, if the amount of work done was higher than the amount of resource 
cost, farmers would also have benefited, because the canal could have served them 
better after the maintenance. 
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Conceptually, the degree of resources mobilised by the farmers for maintenance 
would depend on the level and extent of facilitation by the project staff. More 
concerted efforts would lead to more resource mobilisation, and vice versa. Likewise, 
the extent of the maintenance work performed would depend on the level of resources 
mobilised for various maintenance activities. If the work performed per unit of 
resources improves overtime, the implication will be that the resource use productivity 
between different years has increased, and that the FO has learned how to use resources 
more efficiently. Thus, three variables could be used in our analysis, i.e., facilitation 
inputs from the project staff, resources mobilised for maintenance, and the maintenance 
work performed. All of these three variables can be translated in monetary terms for a 
given year, t, and more specifically, be identified as the cost of facilitation (Ft), the 
value of resources mobilised (Rt), and the value of the work done (Wt). 
The ratio of the value of resources mobilised to facilitation costs for the year t 
(Rt/Ft) represents returns to facilitation (RFt). Likewise, the ratio of the value of the 
work accomplished to the value of resources mobilised in the year t(Wt/Rt) represents 
returns to resource mobilisation (RRt). Similarly, the ratio of value of work done in 
the year t to the cost of facilitation in the year t (Wt/Ft) represents the work response 
to facilitation (WFt). Since data for only two years are available, the conclusions 
drawn indicate a short-term trend. 
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the returns to facilitation increase 
during the successive years, or, RF2 > RF1, implying that the FO can mobilise more 
resources per unit of facilitation. An important limitation of this analysis, however, is 
that the work done by the FO was not evaluated technically. This precluded the 
possibility of evaluating the work response to the resource mobilisation. 
Both, the project staff and the farmer-leaders participated in the mobilisation 
efforts. The farmer-leaders’ inputs used during the mobilisation effort are not valued 
as facilitation, as these reflect FOs capacity to undertake maintenance, and are 
treated as resources mobilised. 
 
Data Requirements and Acquisition 
Testing the hypothesis outlined above requires data pertaining to the costs of 
facilitation and the value of the resources mobilised. IWMI’s project staff recorded 
the maintenance activities as a part of their routine process documentation. This data 
provided the information relating to the value of resources mobilised, such as 
number of farmers, tractors, fuel consumption, distance travelled and the time spent 
at work. IWMI’s records provided information about the cost of facilitation such as 
salaries of staff, fuel and maintenance costs of the vehicles etc. 
 
Cost of Facilitation 
The cost of facilitation includes staff salaries, benefits, and transport. The cost 
for individual staff members have been calculated by multiplying their daily salaries 
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and benefits by the number of days each staff member was involved in the activity. 
The field staff uses motorbikes to travel in the field. The total fuel consumption and 
the depreciation and maintenance costs have been incorporated for the use of 
motorbikes. For other vehicles, the distance travelled during the activity has been 
multiplied by the per kilometre rates for fuels, maintenance and depreciation. The 
cost for the driver’s labour has also been included. 
 
Value of Resources Mobilised 
Manpower and tractors were mobilised to undertake the maintenance 
activities. The manpower used spades and undertook activities, such as filling rain 
cuts etc., which did not require machinery. Tractors were used for earthmoving, 
strengthening of banks and removing silt from the channel bed. The time farmer-
leaders spend on surveying the distributary, assessing the maintenance, identifying 
sites as well as motivating their farmer-colleagues is treated as a resource mobilised. 
Leaders’ rates have been assessed at double the wage rate of that for ordinary 
farmers, whereas market wage rates have been used for ordinary farmers, because 
leaders time has been considered to be more valuable. 
Tractors had two important cost elements, i.e., for bringing and sending back 
the tractor to the work site and the cost of the work performed. The former considers 
the total distance for travelling from the origin to the work destination and back. The 
total amount of fuel used has been determined and multiplied by the fuel price to 
obtain the cost of the fuel consumed. Generally, tractors are hired out at a standard 
rate per hour. This rate has been multiplied by the total number of hours that tractors 
worked at the sites. While no refreshments were served during 1997–98 as the 
maintenance was undertaken during the month of Ramadhan, the cost of 
refreshments to the workers in 1998–99 was borne by the FO, and has been treated 
as a resource mobilised. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
The summarised form of cost calculations for facilitation and the value of 
resources mobilised (Annexes 2 and 3) indicates that 65 man-days were used for 
facilitation during 1997–98 which was reduced to 22 man-days during the 
subsequent year. The costs of facilitators to reach farmers and their leaders were also 
included, which also declined during 1998–99. Compared to 1997–98, the cost of 
facilitation in 1998–99 was cut down by 33 percent at current prices and by almost 
half at the prices of 1997–98. 
The value of resources mobilised during the second year also declined as a 
result of lower facilitation inputs. At 1997–98 prices, the decline in the value of 
manpower mobilised in 1998–99 is over one-fifth, and equivalent to around 14 
percent at current prices. Likewise, the value of the machinery mobilised during 
1998–99 was almost 40 percent less than that during 1997–98. Overall, the decline in 
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the total value of resources mobilised equalled around one-third that of the value for 
1997–98. Thus, a direct, but not necessarily proportionate relationship between the 
facilitation inputs and the value of resources mobilised, becomes evident. 
Table 1 shows the changes in facilitation inputs and resources mobilised. 
While the facilitation inputs during 1998–99 were almost half that of the previous 
year, the decline in the value of resources mobilised was one-third. The decline in 
resource mobilisation might not be due to decreased facilitation alone. Other factors 
such as unimproved water supply situation after the last years’ activities, especially 
in the tail areas, would also have curtailed farmer’s inputs. Besides, the disturbance 
in the water supply due to initiation of work on distributary lining, which made the 
supply erratic, could be another reason for lesser resource mobilisation. Another 
possible reason for less resource mobilisation during 1998–99 could be allocation of 
money by PID for bank strengthening. The farmers were afraid that their efforts 
would not save money to the government, as the farmers would undertake work and 
the irrigation department would claim false bills against those works. If part of the 
reduced resource mobilisation during 1998–99 is attributed to above mentioned 
factors, more returns to facilitation could be expected. 
 
Table 1 
Changes in Returns Over Time to Facilitation at the Hakra 4-R Distributary 
Description 1997–98 1998–99 Change 1998–99* Change* 
Ft (Rupees) 85,823 55,805 –35% 45,078 –47% 
Rt (Rupees) 114,440 81,955 –28% 76,255 –33% 
RFt 1.33 1.48 +11% 1.69 +27% 
*at 1997–98 prices. 
 
In terms of returns to facilitation, each rupee invested on facilitation in 1997–
98 yielded 1.33 rupees, which increased at current prices to 1.48 rupees during the 
following year. The returns in 1998–99 in real terms were even higher, to the tune of 
1.69 rupee per rupee of facilitation. The returns in real terms have increased by 27 
percent when compared to the base year, which shows that gradually withdrawing 
facilitation might be possible without much impact on resource mobilisation. If the 
FO keeps this momentum, it may become possible to sustain collective maintenance 
with minimum facilitation. To withdraw facilitation completely, however, would 
require more efforts. Facilitation would be required to build the FO’s capacity to 
undertake various managerial and other tasks, which will enable the FO to mobilise 
resources and undertake maintenance more efficiently. Such facilitation may include 
devising mechanisms to assess maintenance needs through “walk-thru” surveys,1 
prioritising and planning the maintenance. 
1The term “Walk-thru” surveys is used by engineers to travel on a channel together with farmers 
and engineers to inspect the physical defects in the channel, and noting down the type of the damage and 
possible causes. 
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To assess the value of the work done, the maintenance requirements need to 
be assessed technically in terms of materials and manpower. Likewise, after the work 
is completed, technical procedures have to be employed to calculate the value of 
work. In general, however, the PID staff feels experienced enough to judge the 
quantity and quality of work without involving precise measurements. The staff 
makes inspections and observations to evaluate and value the work performance. The 
Haroonabad Sub-division Irrigation Department’s Sub-divisional Officer (SDO) 
judged a saving of 0.3 to 0.4 million rupees as a result of farmers’ maintenance 
initiatives in 1997–98 [Vander Velde (1998), p. 13]. If this estimate is considered 
valid, then the FO had performed the work at almost one-third of the cost that the 
PID would incur. Since the FO has established that it can undertake the maintenance 
works at one-third of the cost incurred by PID, any investment on facilitation which 
keeps the cost of work within PID estimates would still save some funds, and would 
be cost effective. 
The reason of PID’s being expensive is that they undertake maintenance 
through contractual system. The contract system has its own limitations, such as 
corruption on award of contract, compromise on quality of work etc. Besides, the 
contractor has also to earn some profit out of the contract. Thus, the contract system 
is expensive compared to farmer’s direct undertaking of works. The FOs can 
potentially reduce transaction costs of the contractual system. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Canal irrigation in the Bahwalnagar District of the Punjab Province is the only 
source of irrigation owing to unsuitable groundwater. Canal supplies have been 
rather erratic and inequitable for various sets of users for many years, causing 
productivity losses for many water users. Erratic water supplies explain farmers’ 
willingness to operate and maintain their irrigation channels themselves. Though the 
farmers pay water charges for the O&M of the system, the amounts still fall short of 
the requirements. The government’s desire to eliminate subsidies on water requires 
that the farmers take over the management of distributary channels. The foregoing 
analysis suggests that the FO of the Hakra 4-R Distributary has shown its collective 
willingness and ability to handle the maintenance of the distributary of its own even 
without incentives. It is important to note that the extent of resource mobilisation 
depends on the level of motivation of the farmers and their perceptions about the 
benefits arising out of the maintenance. Since the maintenance initiatives by the FO 
were totally voluntary, many farmers who would have otherwise contributed, may 
not have contributed because the FO did not have any sanctioning power for non-
participants. The full potential for resource mobilisation therefore may not have been 
exploited, which would increase as the FO is given full responsibility for canal 
operation and maintenance together with required authority and power. Thus, 
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appropriateness of the legal and administrative instruments empowering the FO is 
extremely important. 
Theoretically, organised farmers have a comparative advantage over the 
government’s management for the O&M of the irrigation and drainage systems, 
which seems to be applicable for the distributary being referred to. The judgement by 
the irrigation staff, that the FO accomplished maintenance at one third of the cost of 
the PID, indicates that organised farmers can mobilise resources to undertake work at 
a lower cost than that incurred by the PID. At the collective level, farmers seem to 
display more interest in the physical upkeep of their channel than does the irrigation 
bureaucracy. Being physically close to the system and direct beneficiaries of 
improved condition of the distributary, it is much easier for farmers to arrange 
needed inputs, and at a cheaper cost. 
This paper shows that the farmers may become strong if they receive the 
required facilitation in the earlier years of organisation. However, the projects 
organising farmers must chalk out a ‘weaning strategy’ right from the start. Gradual 
reduction in facilitation helps to induce sustainability in the organisation, as the 
organised farmers may gradually take over the needed tasks themselves. Certain 
services, such as assessing maintenance needs, designing of new infrastructure 
components for improved water delivery, advice on improving water charge 
assessment and collection, improving accounting, etc. may yet be needed from 
outside, for which mechanisms have to be devised. 
However, the effectiveness of farmers’ efforts in O&M would depend on the 
degree of improvement in the quality of irrigation service they receive after making 
resources available for the O&M of the distributary. A lack of clear benefits arising 
out of maintenance may adversely impact farmers’ enthusiasm to operate and 
manage their irrigation or drainage system. It is imperative that the PIDAs should 
devolve the O&M responsibilities as early as possible to those FOs that show the 
willingness to undertake needed functions. Indeed, farmers’ willingness also depends 
on the way they have been motivated and assisted to form their organisations. Thus, 
the appropriateness of organisational methodologies to foster collective action is 
most important for the success of the institutional reforms being implemented in the 
irrigation and drainage sector. 
Looking at Pakistan’s past history of collective action, where policy level 
incentives—such as low interest loans for cooperatives or cheap watercourse 
improvements—have not been a sustainable option, the experience of the Hakra 4-R 
Distributary FO offers an opportunity to use capacity building and training as an 
incentive for sustainable collective action for water resource management. 
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Annexures 
Annexure 1 
Cost on Facilitating the Farmers’ Organisation for Maintenance at the Hakra 4–R Distributary 
during the Two Canal Closure Periods 
1997–98 1998–99 
1998–99 at 1997–98 
Prices 
Cost Item (Units) 
Units 
Used 
Average 
Unit Cost 
(Rs) 
Total Cost 
(Rs) 
Units  Unit Cost 
(Rs) 
Total 
Cost 
(Rs) 
Unit Cost 
(Rs) 
Total Cost 
(Rs) 
(A)  Salary and Benefits of Staff (Mandays) 
(B)  Mobility Cost 
         Motorbike (Kms.) 
         Vehicles (Kms.) 
Total Cost (Rupees) 
65 
 
22,759 
1,910 
463.1 
 
1.5 
11.3 
30,101 
55,722 
34,139 
21,583 
85,823 
22 
 
12,638 
1,410 
778.1 
 
1.7 
12.2 
17,118 
38,687 
21,485 
17,202 
55,205 
463.1 
 
1.5 
11.3 
10,188 
34,890 
18,957 
15,933 
45,078 
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Annexure 2 
Value of Resources Mobilised for Maintenance at the Hakra 4–R Distributary 
during the Two Canal Closure Periods 
1997–98 1998–99 
1998–99 at 1997–98 
Prices 
Item (Units) 
Units  Unit Value 
(Rs) 
Total 
Value 
(Rs) 
Units  Unit 
Value (Rs) 
Total 
Value 
(Rs) 
Unit Value 
(Rs) 
Total 
Value 
(Rs) 
(A)  Manpower (Mandays) 
          Farmers 
          Farmer-leaders 
(B)  Machinery with Operators 
(C)  Refreshments 
       Total Value (Rupees) 
 
674 
26.5 
 
 
100 
200 
 
72,700 
67,400 
5,300 
41,740 
0 
114,440 
 
540 
15 
 
 
110 
220 
 
62,700 
59,400 
3,300 
16,390 
2,865 
81,955 
 
100 
200 
 
57,000 
54,000 
3,000 
16,390 
2,865 
76,255 
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